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Technology

Why conventional VC is failing deep tech — and what can repair it

Europe’s deep tech future hinges on evolving investment strategies. The reason for this is that traditional funding models cannot support the long-term financial commitments that innovation demands. There is a European paradox where, despite substantial scientific research, early commercialisation and a focus on shorter-term goals prevent the region from realising the full potential of deep tech. Although startups provide strong support, the sector still lags behind the US and Asia in bringing breakthroughs from the lab to market.

To maintain a competitive industry, Europe needs to advance technologies like AI, robotics, synthetic biology, and quantum computing, which are at the heart of the deep tech sector. These technologies aren’t just profitable. They can transform the world, from cochlear implants restoring hearing to aerospace engineering enabling missions to Mars. But none of these advances happen without patient, long-term investment in science, engineering, and design.

Startups focused on rapid-deployment SaaS or consumer apps can commercialise quickly and attract early investment. Deep tech is different: there’s a “valley of death” driven by long R&D cycles, high upfront costs, and greater risk tolerance than in traditional software ventures.

It’s worth examining which new funding models are working — and how they are starting to take hold in Europe. Drawing on insights from my investment practice — Zubr Capital — this analysis explores the real opportunity for Europe to leverage deep tech and reclaim lost market share, rather than see its startups move to mature financial ecosystems like the US, Asia, or Israel.

Why classic VC struggles with deep tech

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Traditional software startups typically follow a familiar funding cycle blueprint. It raises a 10-year fund, deploys gained capital over three to five years, and aims for lucrative investment exits within five to seven years. The startup defines a successful funding cycle based on rapid growth, scalability, and relatively low capital requirements.

Deep tech cannot operate within this traditional financial mould. Startups operating in this category need development cycles that often exceed a decade. Regulations from subcategories like healthcare, energy, and aerospace require numerous certifications and tests to verify advanced capabilities. That is an area where generalist VCs rarely tread due to a need for patient capital.

Most deep tech companies have to overcome specific industrial and geographical thresholds. A French aerospace firm, for instance, may not have the infrastructure to take advantage of traditional funding the way a US giant like Delta can.

Established investment models present several obstacles to deep tech companies. For example:

  • Pressure for visible traction pushes startups to pivot from deep tech to commercial projects.
  • Traditional VCs often lack the expertise to evaluate complex projects properly.
  • Europe has smaller funds for upfront and long-term costs.
  • There is a “valley of death” for deep tech to cover R&D from public funds.
  • EU investors tend to be risk-averse due to the stigma of failure.
  • Fragmentation within the industry, with multiple markets, regulations, and heavy bureaucracy, slows funding.
  • Foreign funding steps in for late-stage rounds, frequently taking the tech to other countries.

Another pain point in deep tech is the reliance on education. A traditional startup leader only has two to three years of higher education. Deep tech requires about five to seven years due to the complexity of the subject matter. An overwhelming 81% of deep tech founders believe European investors lack the knowledge to really understand the in-depth details of their projects or goals.

There also simply isn’t enough money to offer. A European fund managing €150mn can write a few €10 to €15 mn checks, but that isn’t enough to build something as complex as a gigafactory or scale a new fusion plant. The mismatch of traditional VC funding with deep tech in Europe is what drives systemic underfunding, stalled startups, and the loss of world-changing innovations. There is a history of outside and foreign entities like Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft, and others picking up European tech talent to integrate into their R&D sectors. Those losses slow European deep tech advancement.

The evidence: when VC fails deep tech

The idea of mismatched VCs isn’t theoretical. There are many real-world examples of funding failures leading to Europe losing deep tech opportunities to international competitors. Here are just a few examples.

Prophesee in France

Prophesee creates neuromorphic vision sensors that enable machines to mimic human sight. The company raised €126mn over several rounds. However, in October of 2024, Prophesee entered judicial recovery after failing to secure additional funding. Even though the startup received massive global recognition for its technical validation (proof of concept), the length and uncertainty of financing led to complications in development.

Mycorena in Sweden

Mycorena had to file for bankruptcy and is now permanently closed. What began with the promise of mycelium-based protein that could be used in all kinds of industries failed after the startup couldn’t secure Series B funding in the mid-2020s. Mycorena was ultimately acquired for next to nothing, underscoring the hurdles deep tech companies encounter during scale-up.

Blickfeld in Germany

Blickfeld was an emerging leader in LiDAR, which enables autonomous vehicles to perceive their environment and operate safely. The company raised a total of €68mn — including €15mn from the European Investment Bank (EIB). But in June 2024, Blickfeld had to file for insolvency. Revenue came in too slowly to meet the demands of patient capital.

There are many other examples of investment shortcomings undermining promising European tech firms. Take MaaS Global in Finland, best known for the Whim app, which burned through too much capital without a sustainable business model. Or Sweden’s Northvolt, whose battery manufacturing business failed even with a blended funding model.

The pattern is strikingly consistent: funding dries up when capital needs spike and investors push for exits while R&D is still trying to work out the final solution. Meanwhile, public funding fails to arrive in time, and technical ambition is quickly sacrificed on the altar of short-term vitality. History is repeating itself, and deep tech is losing out.

Northvolt’s gigafactory in Sweden ceased production after the company’s bankruptcy. Credit: NorthvoltNorthvolt's gigafactory in Sweden ceased production after the company's bankruptcy

What’s emerging instead: new investment models

For Europe to capitalise on deep tech, change must happen — and happen fast. New funding models and structures are required to meet the sector’s needs. Alternative solutions could be the final leg of the journey to overcome issues like the “valley of death” for deep tech. Which funding initiatives will get us there?

  • Government-backed & hybrid schemes. We need to replicate the EIC’s investment strategy of grants, equity, and hybrid investments. The EIC Accelerators, for example, offer up to €17.5mn per company, and the new STEP Scale-up Scheme targets growth rounds of €10-30 million. Government-backed funds, such as Bpifrance and the German Zukunftsfonds, meanwhile, can help de-risk early innovation and fill funding gaps for deep tech.
  • Public-private partnerships. Pooling resources is an important way to fund deep tech. When state, corporate, and private investors work together, they naturally expand the usable timeline of a development group, boosting financial support for proofs of concept and market launches.
  • Corporate Venture Capital (CVC). The strategic investment arms of companies like Volkswagen, Airbus, Siemens, and Bosch help fund deep tech. Not only do they offer financial support, but they also tend to have technical expertise and access to advanced equipment that can bring the technology to life. Lilium is a good example. The German eVTOL startup secured funding from grants and private players, having received €200mn from the Mobile Uplift Consortium.
  • Family offices and alternative private investors. Private wealth has also entered the deep tech space. Family offices like Strüngmann Brothers (BioNTech) can back companies from inception to scale. These entities are less constrained by traditional fund structures, allowing greater investment impact with stronger strategic alignment for the long term.
  • Venture studios and university-linked funds. Deep tech venture studio ecosystems can ensure research from universities makes the leap to scalable businesses. Initiatives such as Fraunhofer Ventures in Germany, CERN Venture Connect in Switzerland, and Creative Destruction Lab in Oxford illustrate this approach. Another good example is Evergreen Capital Vehicles, which helps nurture science spinouts before they transition into commercially focused entities.

It is important to note that these funding models alone are still not enough. They help create vibrant, regional successes, but the fragmentation of industries leaves infrastructure gaps in different European countries. The concentration of sectors like aerospace in Germany, batteries in Sweden, and EIT deep tech talent in Spain only widens such gaps. Progress is encouraging, but geographical coverage must be balanced to overcome Europe’s “patchwork” of financial inefficiencies.

The missing innovation: financial tools still not used

Despite all these progressive financial models, truly innovative financial solutions remain largely absent from the deep tech ecosystem in Europe. Many think tanks, EU policy papers, and founder forums highlight the need for longer time-to-revenue projects and solutions to high upfront costs, but the current tools are not quite up to the task.

As of 2022, no European deep tech startup has successfully used IP-backed loans, R&D pre-purchase agreements, revenue-based financing, or advance market commitments. Such models are helpful, but have yet to tackle the challenges around scaling a business, time to market, and elevated risk profiles.

The dominance of traditional financial models exists because grants, equity rounds, and hybrid public-private schemes cannot account for regulatory uncertainty, lack of institutional experience, and risk aversion.

As a result, Europe is falling behind and will continue to do so until financial innovation moves from theoretical idea to practical application. The good news is that such adaptation is already happening elsewhere, providing a framework for Europe to follow.

Global contrast: what works elsewhere

The US and Israel are turning deep tech into operational success using practical funding tools. Take Helion Energy in the US. The company has developed advanced fusion systems and recently raised $425mn to advance this technology over the next three years. Funding milestones were introduced to de-risk capital and support pre-purchase contracts.

Another example of adaptive funding fueling deep tech success is Climeworks. The company has benefited from revenue-based financing through corporate carbon offset agreements. Thanks to the predictable revenue streams, investors like Microsoft and Stripe have been able to provide funding crucial for scaling Climeworks’ direct air capture technology.

Innovative funding has also boosted Israel’s Phantom Energy. The company is using IP-backed loans to enable prototyping without dilution, leveraging patents as collateral. In every case, the funding tool is designed to “match” the technology. Europe can learn from these successes. With flexible funding that accommodates longer development cycles and eases failure risks, the continent will progress further in deep tech.

What Europe needs to change

If Europe wants a seat at the deep tech table, it needs to change. Incremental steps, like the examples listed above, won’t be enough. Insufficient patient capital with too many funds operating on short, exit-driven cycles must give way to new models. In their place, we need pan-European “evergreen” funds, growth-stage vehicles, and public-private platforms.

Fund sizes remain too small, and financial innovation is lacking. To address this, Europe needs well-publicised pilot projects involving creative investment models, such as IP-backed finance and non-dilutive hybrid modelling.

If Europe fosters greater collaboration and co-investment, we can reduce fragmentation and harmonise regulations. This could speed up grant distribution and create international “fast lanes” that shift the culture from fear of risk to celebrating experimentation.

Bold action is necessary to streamline bureaucracy and build technical investing talent that feeds both VCs and deep tech startups. We must change the culture. The deep tech investment ecosystem urgently needs to adapt to unlock the sector’s potential.

From paradox to progress

Europe has a world-class science community and a vibrant startup scene. To ensure success and stop promising projects from moving abroad, direct action is needed to scale deep tech ventures and address structural funding gaps.

The classic venture capital solution doesn’t fit the deep tech sector. While new models and regional initiatives are emerging and achieving some success, critical pieces are still missing, especially in late-stage capital and financial innovation.

Europe must seize this pivotal moment to reshape its capital stack into one of patience, scale, and flexibility. That will foster resilient, world-leading companies. But it will take the collective work of policymakers, investors, and founders to move beyond theory and into actionable success.

Categories
Science

Sugar is sugar is sugar – half 2 – watts with this?

In view of that that the corn syrup (HFCS) with high fructose corn syrup is just sugar water and is a similar composition as table sugar, why is it disparaging?

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Villars HFCs is an growing out of the more general war war against sugar. Under the pretext (or misunderstanding) that HFCs in fructose is “high”, a lot of research was carried out to examine the results of the feeding of 100% fructose to animals and humans.

“Although that HFCS adiposity hypothesis It may have been developed initially, as Popkin recently claimed, simply “science” (link) to “lane” (link) quickly his own life. This once secular component was slandered into scientific circles and then in the public sector when the hypothesis was translated as a fact by leading nutritional magazines, weekly and specialty magazines, national and local newspapers and an endless number of television news as a fact. ” [ source ]

Barry Popkin, a co-author of the study mentioned above, was quickly packed on the hypothesis:

“Even the Two Scientists who first propagated the idea of a unique link between high-fructose corn syrup and America's soaring Obesity Rates have Gently Backed Off from their Initial Theories. Barry M. Popkin, A Nutrition Professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Says that a that a that A that a Widely Read Paper on the Subject that Wrote in 2004 with George A. Bray, a Professor of Medicine at the Pennington Biomedical Research Center in Baton Rouge, La. “…” It was a theory that should boost science, but it is quite possible that it is not true, “said Professor Popkin. “I don't think there should be a perception that corn syrup triggered with high fructose corn until we know more.” “[ source ]

Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is the current secretary for health and human services of the US federal government with control over the centers for the control and prevention of diseases (CDC), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).

Robert F. Kennedy Jr. said in 2024: High-fructose corn syrup 'is only a formula to make them obesity and diabetics. ” [ source ]

This opinion depends on the great research, which has examined the metabolic differences between the diets that contain only fructose compared to exclusively glucose diets.

“If the HFCS adiposity hypothesis is correct, HFCs should not be present in sucrose. Glucose will produce metabolic anomalies (7.8). [source]

In fact, the 1994 review mentioned came to the conclusion:

“These conclusions should not be interpreted as a warning to restrict all fructose foods. In fact, fructose is an important natural component in our diet, and a plenty of source for carbohydrate in fruits and vegetables. To be on the food on food food. Harmful metabolic effects. ” [ source ]

A diet with high fructose in the absence of glucose will “produce metabolic anomalies”. There is no lack of diet that contains sucrose or HFCs, the necessary glucose to produce these metabolic anomalies. Both sucrose and HFCs are approximately the same: 50% glucose and 50% fructose.

In part 1 of this essay I have this picture of Bray et al. (2004) shown:

And I asked the readers whether they could see what had been left out of the graphic. The following graphic answers this question:

The data comes from different sources, but close enough for our comparison. Bray et al. Give estimated recordings of “totally fructose” and “free fructose” against US overweight and obesity rates. Total fructose means the entire fructose made of sucrose (half fructose) plus the entire fructose from fruits plus the entire fructose of HFCs (which is shown as “free fructose”, which is about half of the entire sugar in HFCs).

What is omitted in this graphic is a change in the recording of overall sugar. The first diagram (Bray) seems to imply that the overall sugar recording has increased, but, as in the second diagram, stated as the “percentage of calorie intake”, which, at least in this point of view, does not really change.

In this diagram we see that the overall sugar intake (not the entire fructose) has risen by around 17% from 1970 to 2005, which does not quite match the previous diagram, which shows an increase in calories by 1% compared to sugar in the same period. Here, too, the difference can be completely due to the difference in the calculation method (what exactly you count and here). However, this is that the acceptance of the amount of pipe and beet sugar in US diets was replaced by almost one to one by the increase in HFCs between 1970 and 2005 and since then. During the same period, grains (flour and grain) and fats increased.

In addition, the domestic use of HFCs in the United States in 2001 has reached a climax and has decreased since then, while the US fatty lane rates have increased:

Is the increase in the use of HFCs overweight and obesity?

Let's see:

One thing is to know that the goal posts were moved for obesity and obesity in 1998:

The BMI classifications for overweight were changed in 1998 by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The NIH took over the classification of the World Health Organization (WHO). Reduction The threshold of overweight from a BMI of 27.8 (men) / 27.3 (women) to a BMI of 25. This change effectively Millions of appropriately by Americans as overweight or obese. Therefore, every historical calculation of overweight/obesity must be included if the older data (in the time frame before 1998) was determined by the current standard or the new standard according to 1998.

If we use an international point of view, we can see with this diagram that HFCS consumption on a national basis does not predict overweight and obesity:

Examples of pure fructose that cause a metabolic structure at high concentrations are common, especially if they are the only carbohydrate source. However, there is no evidence that the usual fructose-glucose-nuts-saccharosis, HFCS42, HFCS 55, honey-das do the same.

This also does not mean that a great increase in the intake of sweeteners and other caloric foods has no influence on overweight and obesity. However, this means that increased use of HFCs in food and drinks does not correspond to increasing overweight and obesity.

Another common claim is that HFCs is a liquid and causes more weight gain in drinks (lemonades, sports drinks, etc.) than solid sugar. This often repeated view is mainly based on a single small human study, Dimeglio and Mattes (2000), [ pdf ]:

“The study examined the difference between two forms of carbohydrate delivery:

  1. Liquid form: The carbohydrate load was delivered as calorically sweetened soda for four weeks.
  2. Solid form: The same carbohydrate load was delivered as Jelly Beans for a separate period of four weeks.

The researchers observed that the carbohydrate load was consumed as a soda that The participants had a significantly larger weight gain Compared to the same amount of carbohydrate as Jelly Beans. “

When I say “little studies”, I mean really small: only 15 people. The participants were offered sweet lemonades for four weeks and as Jelly Beans for 4 weeks, in addition to their otherwise normal daily diet. Something was certainly tested, but not whether liquid or fixed sweeteners caused more weight gain. Here the summary of the graphic data, in which it is claimed to show “significantly larger weight gain” for liquid (soda) sugar (with my notations):

­[ Click for larger image ]

All other studies on this topic are mouse and rat studies. Why this is important is discussed here and here (and many, many more).

Important note: The innocence of HFCs as a unique or special cause of obesity and obesity does not mean that excessive over -consumption of calorie food (sugar, strength, fat) does not contribute to these conditions. It is just the case that HFCs does not do this in any special way.

In summary:

So that HFCs are somehow particularly adesogenic (obesity), it would have to distinguish from sucrose in an important way. However, HFCs is essentially the same as sucrose.

If HFCs were unique, HFCS use and obesity would be collapsed nationally and internationally. You are not. In the United States, HFCS use has decreased by almost 20% in the past two decades, while the obese rates continue to rise.

Diabetes is related to obesity, whereby obesity is particularly considered the cause of type II diabetes. Since HFCs itself is not a special cause of obesity, it is probably not the cause of diabetes. There is no evidence that taking HFCS diabetes causes one of the two types.

Despite the popular Health Press and despite the opinion of Robert F. Kennedy Jr., the US Food and Drug Administration still says:

We are not aware of evidenceIncluding the above studies, that there is a difference in the safety between food with HFCS 42 or HFCS 55 and food with similar amounts of other nutrients with sweeteners with approximately the same glucose and fructose content such as sucrose, honey or other traditional confectionery. ” [ source ]

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The author's comment:

I am not aware of any real evidence that HFCs are more or less harmful or advantageous than any other sweetener of glucose/fructose. The FDA is not either.

There are many arguments based on a half -understood science, but no real evidence.

In my opinion, HFCs is simply based on the misunderstanding based on the misunderstanding of his name on the basis of the long -term war against sugar and only on the basis of the misunderstanding of his name. (see Propter nouns)

Please do not deal with obesity epidemic. It's about HFCs.

Thanks for reading.

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